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Summary 
The future status of Kosovo is perhaps the most sensitive and potentially 
destabilizing political question in the Balkans. The Administration views "getting 
Kosovo right" as key to integrating the Balkans into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This 
report discusses the issue of Kosovo's future status; that is, whether it should become 
an independent country, or have some form of autonomy within Serbia. Talks on 
Kosovo's status could start in fall 2005, if Kosovo is deemed to have made sufficient 
progress on a set of standards established by the international community. The 109th 
Congress may consider legislation on Kosovo's status. This report will be updated as 
events warrant. For more on the current situation in Kosovo, see CRS Report RL3 1053, 
Kosovo and U.S. Policy. 
Background 
The current status of Kosovo is governed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, 
passed in June 1999 at the end of the Kosovo conflict. The resolution authorizes an 
international military and civilian presence in Kosovo, the duration of which is at the 
discretion of the Security Council. The NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR is charged 
with maintaining a secure environment, while the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is 
given the chief role in administering Kosovo on a provisional basis. The resolution 
provides for an interim period of autonomy for Kosovo of undefined length, until 
negotiations on the future status of the province take place. UNMIK is tasked with 
gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to elected, interim autonomous 
government institutions, while retaining an oversight role. 
In a future stage, UNMIK will oversee the transfer of authority from the interim 
autonomous institutions to permanent ones, after Kosovo's future status is determined. 
UNSC Resolution 1244 provides little insight into how the status issue should be 
resolved, saying only that it should be determined by an unspecified "political process." 
However, the resolution explicitly confirms the territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and neighboring Montenegro) and calls for 
"substantial autonomy" for Kosovo "within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." The 
FRY was dissolved in February2003, replaced with a looser "state union" entitled "Serbia 
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and Montenegro." Kosovars believe that the dissolution of the FRY invalidates this 
portion of UNSC Resolution 1244, while the international community views Kosovo as 
part of Serbia. 
In May 200 1, after consultation with local leaders, UNMIK issued a Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. The Constitutional Framework 
called for a Kosovo parliament and government, which was formed in March 2002 after 
parliamentary elections. UNMIK has oversight or control of policy in many "reserved 
competencies," including law enforcement, the judiciary, protection of the rights of 
communities, monetary and budget policy, customs, state property and enterprises, and 
external relations. UNMIK can invalidate legislation passed by the parliament if it judges 
it to be in conflict with UNSC Resolution 1244. KFOR remains in charge of Kosovo's 
security. The Constitutional Framework does not address the question of Kosovo's future 
status, saying only that it would be determined through a process "which shall ... take into 
account all relevant factors, including the will of the people." 
"Standards Before Status" 
In 2002, UNMIK chief Michael Steiner outlined a series of standards of international 
expectations for Kosovo's institutions and society, and said that they should be achieved 
before the issue of Kosovo's future status is discussed. This policy has been dubbed 
"standards before status," and it forms the basis of U.S. and international policy in 
Kosovo. The standards are ( I )  the existence of effective, representative and functioning 
democratic institutions; (2) enforcement of the rule of law; (3) freedom of movement; (4) 
sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons, and respect for the rights of 
communities; (5) creation of a sound basis for a market economy; (6) fair enforcement of 
property rights; (7) normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and (8) transformation of the 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate. UNMIK released a highly 
detailed "Standards Implementation Plan" on March 3 1, 2004. 
In November 2003, U.S. Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman announced, with 
the support of the other members of the international Contact Group (Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Russia), a formal review in mid-2005 on Kosovo's progress toward 
meeting the standards. If in the judgement of the Contact Group, the U.N. Security 
Council and other interested parties, this progress is "sufficient," a process to determine 
the province's status may begin. 
The international community's nearly five years of efforts to bring stability to 
Kosovo suffered a serious blow in March 2004. The death of two ethnic Albanian boys 
near the divided city of Mitrovica sparked two days of rioting throughout Kosovo on 
March 17-18, in the worst inter-ethnic violence since the end of the 1999 Kosovo war. 
Ethnic Albanian crowds attacked several ethnic Serb enclaves as well as international 
security forces trying to control the rioters. In the course of two days, 19 civilians were 
killed, more than 900 persons were injured, and over 4,000 forced from their homes by 
the violence. 
' For copies of UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Standards Implementation Plan, see the UNMIK 
website, available online at [http://www.unmikonline.org], accessed on July 18, 2005. 
The March 2004 riots in Kosovo called into question the performance of UNMIK 
and KFOR, as well as Kosovo's government institutions and media. The international 
community took two main steps in response. One was to reorganize international 
procedures and organizations in Kosovo to improve their effectiveness. Another was to 
streamline the standards process to focus on "priority" standards, mainly those involving 
the respect of minority rights. According to some U.N. officials and independent 
observers, one key purpose of streamlining the standards was to accelerate consideration 
of Kosovo's status and the eventual departure of UNMIK from Kosovo. 
2005: Year of Decision for Kosovo? 
In testimony before the House International Relations Committee on May 18,2005, 
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns laid out a new U.S. policy initiative on Kosovo, 
in coordination with the U.N. and the Contact ~ r o u p . ~  He declared that 2005 was the 
"year of decision" for Kosovo, meaning that the United States wanted a process to 
determine Kosovo's future status to be launched this year. He said that the current 
uncertainty over status is "not sustainable or desirable" because it "satisfies no one and 
leaves open the possibility of renewed ethnic violence," threatening to undo U.S. 
successes in the Balkans over the past decade. 
Consistent with the review date policy announced in 2003, U.N. envoy Kai Eide is 
currently preparing a report on whether Kosovo has made "sufficient progress" in 
implementing the standards. Burns said Eide would base the evaluation not just on 
"technical" fulfillment of the standards but also on "larger political issues." According 
to Undersecretary Bums, while the outcome is not a foregone conclusion, the United 
States is "hopeful" that the review (which is expected to be completed in "late summer") 
will be positive. Ifthe assessment is in fact positive, Burns said, the U.N. and the Security 
Council would decide "this fall" whether to open Kosovo status negotiations. Burns said 
that the United States would call for a "swift" launch of the talks. He said the United 
States would advocate that "a senior European political figure" be appointed by the U.N. 
(in consultation with the Contact Group) to lead the talks. This figure would have a 
"senior American diplomat" as his deputy. 
Bums said that the talks would involve "dialogue" between the Serbian and Kosovo 
governments, while the Kosovo Serbs and other Kosovo minority communities would 
"have a role in the process." The format for the talks has not been decided but could 
involve convening all of the leaders in one place, as was done for Bosnia's Dayton Peace 
Accord, or shuttle diplomacy, or some other format. Given its role as mediator, the 
United States has not supported a particular outcome for status talks, ruling out only one 
outcome - direct rule by Belgrade, and saying that the result must enhance regional 
stability and the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans. Bums laid out several 
principles for a settlement, including that it must "be based on multi-ethnicity with full 
respect for human rights, including the right of all refugees and displaced persons to 
return to their homes in safety; offer effective constitutional guarantees to ensure the 
protection of minorities; include specific safeguards for the protection of cultural and 
religious heritage; and promote effective mechanisms for fighting organized crime and 
For a text of Undersecretary Bums's statement, see the State Department website: 
[http:/lwww.state.gov/plusl~2005/46471 .htm] 
terrorism." Burns added that the Contact Group has told the parties that status "must not 
be decided by any party unilaterally or result from the use of force; not change the 
boundaries of the current territory of Kosovo, either through partition or through a new 
union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country after the resolution of Kosovo's 
status; fully respect the territorial integrity of all other states in the region; ensure that 
Kosovo continues to develop in a sustainable way both politically and economically; and 
that Kosovo does not pose a military or security threat to its neighbors." 
Burns added that an international civilian and military presence would continue after 
a status settlement in order to ensure its full implementation, including provisions on 
minority rights. He said that the United States would like the European Union to lead 
this effort, although the United States would remain "an active partner." Burns said that 
the United States hopes that a U.N. Security Council resolution to endorse the outcome 
of the status talks will be approved before the end of 2006. 
Options for Kosovo's Status 
Although it is too early to say what Kosovo's future status will be, direct rule of the 
entire province from Belgrade is unlikely, since it could only be accomplished by violent 
actions similar to those taken by Milosevic in 1998 and 1999, which triggered 
international intervention in the first place. Another possible outcome is independence. 
Between these two poles lie some form of complete or near-complete self-government for 
Kosovo, while retaining some degree of nominal Serbian sovereignty, the exact contours 
of which would be subject to negotiation between Belgrade, the Kosovo government, and 
the international community. These outcomes could stand on their own or be 
accompanied by cantonization or partition of Kosovo into a small, Serbian-controlled area 
in northern Kosovo and an ethnic Albanian-controlled south. Each of these possibilities 
could have positive or negative consequences for Kosovo and the region. 
Independence for Kosovo would respond to the political preferences of the 
overwhelming majority of the province's inhabitants. However, some observers fear that 
an independent Kosovo could destabilize the region by encouraging separatist ethnic 
Albanian forces in Macedonia, as well as Serbia's Presevo Valley, where many ethnic 
Albanians live. Some also fear international support for Kosovar independence could 
undermine the democratic leadership in Belgrade and strengthen extreme nationalists 
there. There are also questions about the ability of the Kosovars to effectively run their 
own affairs in the near future or implement any commitments on minority rights, due to 
the country's poverty and the immaturity of ethnic Albanian political and social 
institutions. An effective Kosovo government is particularly important for the issue of 
dealing with powerful organized crime groups and political extremists in the province. 
Some have suggested that Kosovo should receive "conditional independence." 
Independence would be granted in exchange for pledges from Kosovo to rule out the 
establishment of a greater Albania and to provide security guarantees to the Serb 
min~r i ty .~  Some call for a Kosovo constitution to be drawn up as part of the status talks 
' Discussions with Balkan officials and U.S. Balkans experts, January 2004. 
that would provide for oversight by international bodies and the continued participation 
of international judges in Kosovo's legal ~ y s t e m . ~  
Those who favor dividing Kosovo believe it would be a more realistic alternative 
than trying to impose multi-ethnicity, In April 2004, the Serbian government unveiled a 
decentralization plan for Kosovo. The plan would set up autonomous Serb regions in 
northern Kosovo, similar in some ways to the current division of Bosnia into "entities" 
under weak central control. Under the proposal, Serbian-majority areas in Kosovo would 
be controlled by local Serb authorities, with their own police. Ethnic Albanian authorities 
would control the rest of the province, although the whole province would remain at least 
nominally within Serbia. Such a plan would have the benefit, from Belgrade's point of 
view, of consolidating its control over northern Kosovo, where most Serbs in the province 
now live, and where important economic assets, such as the Trepca mining complex, are 
found. Ethnic Albanian leaders strongly oppose the idea for these very reasons. 
International officials fear that partition of the province along ethnic lines could 
spark renewed violence over disputed areas. They also believe it could set a bad example 
for the region, resulting in renewed calls to partition Bosnia, southern Serbia, and 
Macedonia. To a certain extent, the 2004 Serbian plan seeks to strengthen and ratify the 
existing situation in northern Kosovo. Since 1999, international officials and ethnic 
Albanians have criticized Serbia for supporting "parallel stmctures" that cement its 
control over Serb-majority areas at the expense of UNMIK's authority. UNMlK is 
working on plans for local government reform that would devolve more powers to the 
local level, but not to the extent advocated by the Serbian government. Some observers 
believe that the Serbian government has begun to de-emphasize its decentralization 
proposals, given some of the issues raised above, and focus on ensuring minority rights 
throughout a united Kosovo. Serbian officials have encapsulated their current position 
on status with the phrase "more than autonomy, but less than independence." 
One important question is what to do if the parties to the negotiation cannot reach 
agreement. U.S. officials say that the international community would not try to impose 
a result. However, given Belgrade's reluctance to discuss hture status and the Kosovars 
rejection of any outcome but independence, it may be difficult to reach a consensus. The 
United States and its allies may therefore be faced with an embarrassing deadlock, such 
as occurred at the failed Rambouillet negotiations that preceded the NATO bombing 
campaign against Serbia in 1999. In his testimony before the House International 
Relations Committee, Undersecretary Burns warned that "undue delay" or obstruction by 
Serbia in status talks could cause the United States to "reevaluate Belgrade's role." 
On the other hand, if the international community attempted to impose a settlement, 
it would be faced with difficult problems. If the Serbian side rejected a proposed 
settlement, it could prevail upon Russia to threaten to veto a Security Council resolution 
endorsing it. The EU could have the strongest leverage over Serbia, if it decided to 
condition Belgrade's EU integration on its acceptance of an EU-supported settlement of 
the status question. However, it is unclear whether the EU would make such a direct 
linkage or whether future EU membership for Serbia is a credible "carrot," given the EU's 
See Kosovo: Toward Final Status, International Crisis Group, January 24, 2005, at 
[http://www.crisisweb.org]. 
current constitutional problems. A move by the United States or other countries to 
endorse a proposed settlement without the support of Serbia, Russia, other members of 
the Contact Group, or the Security Council could provoke recriminations, such as those 
that bedeviled international policy in the Balkans in the early 1990s. Leverage over the 
Kosovar side may also be limited. Kosovar leaders know that the international 
community has little desire to administer Kosovo indefinitely, particularly given the 
possibility that the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo could become more hostile to the 
international presence if their demands for independence continue to be rejected. 
However, Kosovo's continued need for aid and security guarantees may be important 
levers for the international community in the talks. 
Congressional Concerns 
The issue of Kosovo's future status has been of significant interest to Members of 
Congress. Some Members favor independence for Kosovo as soon as possible, a view not 
shared by the Administration. They say Kosovars should enjoy the same right of self- 
determination enjoyed by other peoples in the region and throughout the world. On the 
other hand, other Members are more skeptical about pushing strongly for Kosovo 
independence in the near future. They say that moving too quickly could destabilize the 
situation in the Balkans. They favor continuing to press the people of Kosovo to 
implement the standards. 
In the 108 '~ Congress, three resolutions were introduced that advocate U.S. support 
for Kosovo's independence. H.Res. 11 and H.Res. 28 express the sense ofthe House that 
the United States should declare support for Kosovo's independence. H.Res. 11 
conditions this support on Kosovo's progress toward democracy, while H.Res. 28 
supports independence without prior conditions. S.Res. 144 expresses the sense of the 
Senate that the United States should support the right of the people of Kosovo to 
determine their political future once "requisite progress" is made in achieving U.N. 
standards in developing democratic institutions and human rights protections. H.Res. 28 
was discussed at a House International Relations Committee hearing on Kosovo's future 
in May 2003 and at a markup session on the resolution in October 2004 but was not voted 
on by the committee and did not receive floor consideration in the logth Congress. 
In the wake of the March 2004 violence in Kosovo, several resolutions were 
introduced to condemn the attacks, as well as subsequent attacks on Islamic sites in 
Serbia. These included H.Res. 587 (Chstopher Smith) and H.Res. 596 (Burton). On 
April 8, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to S.Res. 326 (Voinovich). The 
resolution, a slightly modified companion version of H.Res. 596, strongly condemned the 
violence, recognized the commitment of Kosovo and Serbian leaders to rebuild what had 
been destroyed and encourage the return of refugees, called on leaders in Kosovo to 
renounce violence and build a multi-ethnic society based on the standards for Kosovo, 
recommended the restructuring of UNMIK, and urged the reinvigoration of dialogue 
between Kosovo and Belgrade. The resolutions note U.S. and international support for 
the "standards before status" policy. 
The 109th Congress may take up the issue of Kosovo's status. On January 4,2005, 
Representative Tom Lantos introduced H.Res. 24, which expresses the sense ofthe House 
that the United States should support Kosovo's independence. Other resolutions may be 
introduced in anticipation of status negotiations. 
